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Abstract
In this study, the most widely accepted threat modeling process, that
has been proposed by Microsoft, is used to identify all possible threats
to telehealth systems. Security threats to a telehealth trial system at
the Center for eHealth and Healthcare Technology, University of Agder,
are analyzed and discussed. Moreover, a list of countermeasures is
suggested to better design and implement system protection solutions
against telehealth insider threats.
1 Introduction
Advances in telehealth systems will likely reduce cost and improve quality of care in
general [1–3]. Although telehealth systems may improve the quality of healthcare,
the digitalization of health records, the collection, evaluation and provisioning of
patient data, and the transmission of patient data over public networks (the Internet)
pose new privacy and security threats to patients and healthcare providers [4–7].
As a result, telehealth system security is of paramount significance [8]. If
developers do not take into account all possible threats against telehealth systems,
they will be unable to provide sufficient security to prevent threats, allowing systems
to be vulnerable to security breaches [8, 9]. Therefore, threat modeling serves as
a foundation for the analysis and specification of security requirements [10, 11].
It involves understanding of system complexity and identification of all possible
threats to the system. Identified threats are further analyzed based on their
criticality and likelihood, and decisions are made whether to mitigate the threats
or accept the associated risks [12]. Once system designers determine which security
mechanisms must be available to the system, the development of these mechanisms
follows the general software engineering cycle of design, implementation, testing and
maintenance [10].
The main objective of this work is to describe and better understand potential
threats to telehealth systems in the following way:
1. An overall threat analysis process is provided by characterizing threat
information (assets, adversary and adversary action) originating from various
threat actors, to better comprehend all types of threats to a telehealth system.
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2. As a proof of concept, the threats to the telehealth trial system at the Center
for eHealth and Healthcare Technology, University of Agder, were analyzed
with support of Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool 2014 [12, 13], and potential
countermeasures for various threats were listed.
Paper Structure
The remaining parts of this study are organized as follows. In section 2, a brief
description of the telehealth system and related work on threat modeling is provided
as background information. Section 3 presents the system architecture and the
threat modeling process. Conclusions and aspects for future work are presented in
section 4.
2 Background
In this section, relevant work underlying the current study is discussed. First,
telehealth systems are briefly introduced, followed by an overview of threat modeling
and threat modeling methodologies.
Telehealth Systems
Telehealth comprises the use of information and communication technologies (ICT)
to offer different, user-group specific healthcare services to participants (patients,
doctors and nurses, etc.) who are in different locations [2]. The remote health
service provision serves a variety of purposes, such as remote patient monitoring (e.g.
home telehealth), specialist referral services and medical education [2, 3]. However,
telehealth raises security and privacy concerns. The number of potential threats in
the field of health information systems has increased dramatically, and the lack of
adequate security measures allows for numerous data breaches [9], leaving patients
and healthcare providers vulnerable to security threats [14]. In order to exploit the
full potential of telehealth services, protection against threats and vulnerabilities is
required.
Threat Modeling Overview
Threat modeling helps to understand system security threats and vulnerabilities, and
how those threats potentially impact users and organizations, and to determine the
most cost-effective security solutions to mitigate attacks [12]. Due to the extensive
cost, time and resources needed for the development on the one side, and due to
the fast emergence of new kinds of threats on the other side, it is almost impossible
to develop a completely secure system. Thus, it is important to decide on the
priority of each asset, and balance between security and cost throughout the system
development. The priority of an asset is determined according to its value and risk
potential to it. Therefore, threat modeling is used to analyze system threats and
vulnerability scenarios in order to evaluate the risk.
Threat modeling methodologies
Academia and industries have undertaken extensive research on the process of
threat modeling. This includes, among many others, Microsoft’s development of the
security life cycle (SDL) [13], the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
[15], the Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Modeling (PASTA) [16], Trike
methodology [17] and the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability
Evaluation (OCTAVE) [18]. The mostly used tool of modeling is that of Microsoft,
which encompasses all aspects of security to offer documentation as a guide through
the remaining process.
SDL is geared more towards the identification of potential threats through
identifying assets and understanding the target application by creating use cases, and
identifying threats based on the Microsoft STRIDE model [12, 19]. Subsequently,
the identified threats are ranked based on the security risk posed using a DREAD
threat-risk ranking model [11].
3 Threat Model for Telehealth Systems
In this section, the main threat components are identified: assets, users, threat
agents and threats to the system.
The process of threat modeling is divided into the three main phases as following:
(1) identifying assets and access points, (2) listing all potential threats and (3)
building a mitigation plan.
1. Identifying assets and access points: An asset is something valuable, owned by
an entity, and that attackers are interested in, and wish to access, control or
destroy. Identifying assets is the primary, most critical step in threat modeling,
because assets are essentially threat targets. Access (or entry) points are
interfaces through which potential attackers can interact with the system to
gain access to assets. Examples of access points include user login interfaces,
file systems and hardware ports. Upon identifying the access points, it is very
important to define the trust boundaries in the system. A trust boundary
is a boundary across which there are varied levels of trust [12]. Trust levels
indicate how much trust is required to access a component of the system.
2. Listing all potential threats: Threats may come from authorized users
(insiders) or unauthorized users (outsiders). All the information gathered from
phase 1 will help to identify all possible threats and threat sources. Adversaries
goals, capabilities and what they might do to the system are all defined as
threats. Threats to the system can be identified by reviewing each asset and
access point in the system, and creating threat hypotheses regarding violations
of asset confidentiality, integrity or availability. In general, threats can be
classified into six classes, following the Microsoft STRIDE model [12, 19]:
• Spoofing is attempting to gain access to a system by using a false identity.
• Tampering is the unauthorized modification of data.
• Repudiation is the ability of users (legitimate or otherwise) to deny that
they performed specific actions or transactions.
• Information disclosure is the unwanted exposure of private data.
• Denial of service is the process of making a system or application
unavailable.
• Elevation of privilege occurs when a user with limited privileges assumes
the identity of a privileged user to gain privileged access to an asset.
3. Building a mitigation plan of countermeasures: Once the basic assets and all
potential threats are understood and identified, setting a control mechanism
to prevent or mitigate threats is proposed in phase 3 of the mitigation plan.
System Description: Telehealth Reference System Overview
In Figure 1 the system architecture of the studied telehealth reference system is
illustrated. The reference system includes the following main system domains:
 The access of the patient to the patient application de-
vice must be authorized. 
 The access of the patient application device (and the 
applications running on it respectively) to the commu-
nication infrastructure must be controlled. 
 The transmission of data between the patient applica-
tion device and any Electronic Health Record (EHR) or 
Personal Health Record (PHR) service component in 
the health information infrastructure must be secured 
(encrypted). 
 The access (e.g. from any telehealth or care service 
provider) to any personal patient data in the health in-
formation infrastructure (i.e. stored and processed in 
any EHR or PHR system) must be controlled. 
 If components in a dedicated national health network as 
the Norwegian Health Network (NHN, [8]) infrastruc-
ture are involved, specific authentication and authoriza-
tion rules for access control might apply. 
 The communication between the information access 
devices of telehealth and other medical and care service 
providers and the EHR or PHR systems in the health 
information infrastructure (as in a NHN) must be se-
cured (encrypted). 
As basis for a more detailed analysis of security related re-
quirements, and for the development and discussion of a secu-
rity concept, we look at the telehealth trial system developed 
for the EU-funded project “UNIversal solutions in TElemedi-
cine Deployment for European HEALTH care” (Unit-
ed4Health, or just U4H), and especially at the solution devel-
oped for the specific Norwegian requirements [9]. The aim to 
support a close cooperation of professional health and care 
providers from different organizations, and to involve even 
informal care providers as relatives, puts specific requirements 
on the system, in particular with respect to the security of the 
patient data. Another focus point for the development and 
evaluation of the U4H trial system has been the usability of 
applications and services for the different involved user groups 
(namely patients and care providers), and we address also the 
specific impacts of security mechanisms on the usability in this 
paper. 
Within the following Materials and Methods section we will 
give a short overview of the U4H tr al system and its main use 
cases. As part of that we will provide a detailed analysis of the 
security-related requirements within the different architectural 
domains of the end-to-end (e2e) system. In the Results section 
we will explain the security concept, which has been imple-
mented in the U4H trial system. In the Discussion section we 
will then look at covered security requirements and potential 
security limitations, and address improvement potential with 
regards to usability. In the Conclusions we will explain the 
general relevance of the security concept (proposed for the 
ongoing U4H trial system) for other telehealth and telecare 
services for the collection and communication of health data. 
Materials and Methods 
Figure 1 shows the systems architecture of the U4H trial sys-
tem with its main domains, the Point-of-Care (PoC) environ-
ment of the patient, the Health Information Services (HIS) 
infrastructure, and the infrastructure for the Health and Care 
Sources, i.e. the different sources of health and care services.  
The U4H Trial System 
The overall purpose of the U4H trial system is the remote 
supervision and follow-up support for COPD patients in their 
home after being discharged from hospital, following a sta-
tionary treatment. We will subsequently explain shortly the 
main functionalities of the system along the different system 
domains. 
Point-of-Care: 
A software application on a tablet-PC supports the patient to 
carry out daily (at least) measurements of his pulse and blood 
oxygen level (SpO2). The SpO2 sensor device communicates 
the measurement values through a wireless Bluetooth (BT) 
connection to the tablet-PC. Additionally, the breathing quality 
of the patient can be measured with a Spirometer device. 
The patient application on the tablet-PC provides furthermore 
a user interface (UI) with questionnaire forms for the daily 
reporting of COPD-symptoms of the patient. 
The data (SpO2 values, optionally Spirometer values, ques-
tionnaire answers) are stored in a local database on the tablet-
PC. From there they are used for an information UI for the 
patient, and are tra smitted to the HIS infra tructure. 
Within the U4H field trial, each COPD-patient uses the tablet-
PC for a temporary period of one month. After that period the 
device is provided to another patient participating in the field 
trial. 
Health Information Services Infrastructure: 
The data from all remotely supervised patients are transmitted 
and stor d in a p rson l electronic health record system (P-
EHR). A dedicated telehealth service provides a Web-based 
information portal for telehealth and care service providers. 
This service takes the patient data from the P-EHR system, 
Figure 1- Architecture overview of United4Health telehealth trial system for COPD patients 
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Figure 1: Architecture overview of the telehealth trial system for patients.
Point-of-Care: The Point-of-Care environment includes devices and applica-
tions for patients in their personal environment (e.g. their home), to facilitate reg-
ular measurements of certain health and care status data, to support self-reporting
of health symptoms along questionnaires, to enable remote consultations (video or
telephony), and to obtain information and follow-up support.
Health & Care Services: Based on the health and care status of the remotely
monitored patients, different healthcare professionals provide collaborative services
to follow-up on the patients according to their individual needs.
Health Information Services (HIS) Infrastructure: The health and
care status information from the patient, which is reported by the devices and
applications in the point-of-care, is collected, stored and provisioned by Electronic
and Personal Health Record systems (EHRs, PHRs). Dedicated monitoring services
utilize and evaluate the patient data, in order to determine value-added information
about the patients’ health condition, and to provide decision support information
for the patient follow-up by the health and care service providers. The automatic
data evaluation includes the triage calculation as explained above.
The typical use case scenario looks like following: in the point-of-care, e.g. the
patients’ home, the patients carry out certain measurements of healthcare relevant
parameters with corresponding wireless body sensors, supported by an application
on the tablet PC. Furthermore they do a self-reporting of their individual subjective
health condition via electronic questionnaires on the tablet PC. The data from
measurements and questionnaires are transmitted to the health information services
infrastructure, and stored in electronic / personal health records (EHRs / PHRs). A
monitoring service utilizes the data from the EHRs/PHRs to evaluate the patients’
healthcare condition, and provides both value-added information as well as the
raw data through a Web-based information portal for cooperating health and care
services, in order to facilitate an optimal and efficient follow-up.
As part of the European funded FP7 project United4Health (U4H) [20] a
telehealth trial system for COPD patients had been developed [21] . End-to-end
security and privacy protection requirements and the solution approach for the trial
system had been analyzed and published [4].
Threat Model Components
1. Identify Assets: An asset is anything that has business value and that must
be protected from misuse by adversaries. The business value of an asset can
range from very high to very low. The value of the identified assets is defined
as the security services to be protected. There are three conventional security
services known as CIA (confidentiality, integrity and authentication). Other
security services considered are authorization and accountability.
Figure 1 illustrates the main components of the studied telehealth trial system
and the information flow between its components. Table 1 represents the
identified assets according to system domain and asset name.
Table 1: Identified assets and their descriptions
Assets
ID System Domain, Asset Name Description
A1 Point-of-Care Assets relating to the underlying system at the patient point-of-care
A1.1 Patient credentials The login credentials used by a patient to log into the system (via a
UI-application on a device).
A1.2 Patient communication de-
vices
A typical device (e.g. smartphone, tablet, PC, etc.) used by patients
at the Point-of-Care (PoC) to display (output-UI), collect (input-UI),
store or transmit patient-specific data. It supports communication
with, and controlling medical devices (e.g. used to read data from a
sensor device, to control an insulin pump, or to get/send parameters
from/to a pacemaker).
A1.2.1 Communication devices cre-
dentials
Device-related information, such as a device identifier and key.
A1.2.2 Application on patient com-
munication devices
A software application on a patient communication device supports the
patient with carrying out daily measurements of certain life signs as
required by the telecare service providers for follow-up decision support
(e.g. in the U4H trial system, a user interface (UI) with questionnaire
forms for daily reporting of COPD patient symptoms).
A1.2.3 Patient-related data The patient communication device will store information related to
the patient. This information can include the patients name, identifier
and answer values for the daily self-reporting of certain disease-specific
symptoms.
A1.3 Patient medical devices A medical device is any instrument, apparatus, implementation,
machine, appliance, implant, in vitro reagent or calibrator, software,
material or other similar or related hardware component, intended to
be used, alone or in combination, by people for one or more of the
specific purposes of diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, and treatment
of disease or other conditions [22] (e.g. peak flow meter, blood pressure
device, pulse oximeter, etc.).
A2 Health Information Services
(HIS) Infrastructure
Assets related to the underlying HIS infrastructure
A2.1 Personal / Electronic Health
Record (PHR/EHR) Servers
All patient-related data (A1.2.3) from all remotely supervised patients
are transmitted and stored in PHRs/EHRs. Data from medical devices
(A1.2 and A1.3) are also stored in PHRs/EHRs.
A2.2 Telehealth Service Server A dedicated telehealth service provides a Web-based information
portal for telehealth and care service providers. This service takes
patient data from the PHR/EHR system, evaluates the data according
to red (critical), yellow (attention), or green (normal) conditions
(Triage), and provides overview pages with the triage results of
all supervised patients, as well as detailed condition pages with all
information from a specific patient collected during supervision.
A3 Health & Care Sources Assets related to the underlying systems of health & care service
providers
A3.1 User credentials Login credentials used by healthcare service members (e.g. doctors
and telehealth nurses) to log into the system (through a website or
dedicated device).
A3.2 Telehealth service terminals Communication devices (tablets, smartphones, workstations) provide
information for all support sources, including the formal and informal
health & care service providers. With a telehealth service terminal
the health and care service providers get access to the Web-portal
containing the overview of patient status and history of detailed
monitoring data provided by the telehealth service in the HIS
infrastructure.
A3.3 Patient-related data Information related to the patients (A1.2.3) retrieved by healthcare
professionals through telehealth terminals. Certain patient-related
data and information can be added or modified by a healthcare service
member (e.g. notes related to diagnoses, the follow-up plan, etc.),
according to the responsibility of the individual healthcare professional
(e.g. nurse, doctor, administrator, family member, friends, etc.).
2. Defining the Trust Levels of System Users: Trust levels represent the access
rights granted to entities (human users, devices and services) as shown in
Table 2, and enforced by the system. Generally, threats can originate from
two primary sources: internal agents (someone with authorized access) and/or
external agents (someone with unauthorized access). In this study, only
internal entities are considered threat agents (Figure 2). The three types of
threat agents considered are: the patients themselves, authorized users (e.g.
formal healthcare professionals and other health and care support staff such as
system administrators) and informal healthcare assistants, such as friends and
family members who provide support to patients and have very limited access
to the system. The protection against internal agents is much more challenging
than against external agents, because insiders are wholly or partially trusted
subjects with legitimate access keys to resources.
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Figure 2: Entities of telehealth trial system.
Moreover, insiders have different motives, resource levels, skills, access
privileges and risk tolerance, leading to the high probability that an attack
will occur [23]. Resources are defined as assets that can be drawn on by an
entity and the degree of access privilege an entity has to them. For instance,
an administrator typically has unlimited access to some or all components (or
parts) of a system as well as physical access to equipment, which is beyond
what other users have access to. Knowledge implies data or information
someone possesses about a particular system. For example, knowing critical
information about a system, such as the security firewall employed for a
particular sever, weak points in the system, and how the system works, can
help to exploit vulnerabilities that allow attacks. Legitimate users such as
administrators have greater ability to obtain knowledge of the target system
without arousing suspicion. Knowledgeable insiders will always have the skills
to undertake an attack that is usually limited to systems they are very familiar
with. The more privileges and skills a person has, the more risk he or she
represents. The motives and goals of insiders vary from one individual attacker
to another. Insiders’ motives range from identity theft to profit or sabotaging
the target system. Some may conduct an attack for personal reasons, such as
revenge on the enterprise or even fulfill plans to invoke policy changes within
a system.
Table 2: Trust levels for threat agents
Trust Levels
ID Name Description
TA1 Patient
TA1.1 Patient with valid login credentials A patient who uses A1.2.2 and has logged in using valid login
credentials.
TA1.2 User with invalid login credentials A user (impersonating a patient) who uses A1.2.2 and is
attempting to log in using invalid login credentials.
TA2 Healthcare Assistant
TA2.1 Formal healthcare professional
with valid login credentials
A user (e.g. doctor, nurse, personal assistant, etc.) who is
connected to A3.2 and has logged in using valid login credentials.
TA2.2 User with invalid login credentials A user (impersonating a formal healthcare professional) who has
connected to A3.2 and is attempting to log in using invalid login
credentials.
TA2.3 Informal healthcare professional
with valid login credentials
A user (e.g. relative, friend, etc.) who is connected to A3.2 and
has logged in using valid login credentials.
TA3 Administrator
TA3.1 Server administrator The database server administrator has read and writes access to
the database used to store PHRs/EHRs (A2.1).
TA3.2 Website administrator The Website administrator can configure the Web-based informa-
tion portal for telehealth and care service providers (A2.2 and
A3.2).
TA4 Other system components
TA4.1 Patient communication device A device that provides applications and user interfaces for the
patients to support the collection, transmission and illustration
of data and information from the patient and the healthcare
provider(s), transmitted via PHRs/EHRs.
TA4.2 PHR/EHR servers A device used to store patient-related data (A1.2.3) from all
remotely supervised patients.
The following entities of the telehealth trial system are shown in Figure 2:
(a) System Administrator - is responsible for system operation and/or
maintenance. It is assumed that the system administrator has access
to all system components, in order to ensure the correct operation
of hardware and software. However, they should not have access to
any health-related information of the patient. Administrators have
sufficient resources and high IT skills. On the one hand, administrators
are generally very trustworthy, but administrators who are not well-
trained might unintentionally threaten the system. On the other hand,
administrators who are dissatisfied or have been bribed may become
spiteful and intentionally cause harm to the system.
(b) Patient - has access to his/her own medical devices, communication
devices and personal medical records. Generally, patients have enough
resources to attack a system, but those who are not IT experts have low
skills to analyze and attack a system. Patients may act maliciously or
non-maliciously to access privileges not assigned to them.
(c) Formal Healthcare Professionals - Doctors: have access to their own
patients’ data, but not that of another doctor’s patients; Nurses or
Personal Assistants: have access to the information of patients they
are responsible for. Healthcare professionals may also have adequate
resources to attack a system because they have access to it, but their
attack skills may be low since they are unlikely to be IT experts.
(d) Informal Healthcare Assistants - friends, visitors and voluntary health
workers have very limited access rights to the system (e.g. read only
access to some of patients’ data). Their role is only that of patient
assistants at the point-of-care, or supporting the remote supervision and
follow-up of the patient based on information about the patients’ health
status.
(e) Technical System Components - devices (e.g. sensors, actuators),
applications and/or processes that act on behalf of the patient, for
instance patient communication devices and medical devices.
3. Data Flow Diagrams (DFD): DFD is a high-level way of disassembling the
system and focusing on its functional components, and to analyze the flows
of data through the system components [11]. DFD makes it easier to identify
threats, to follow and analyze the adversary’s data and commands throughout
the system, and to identify which assets they interact with [10]. Figure 3 shows
the DFD for the telehealth trial system, which was modeled with Microsoft
threat modeling tools 2014.
4. Identifying Threats
Table 3 summarizes the identified threats, which are categorized according to
the following types: authentication, authorization and access, privacy, as well
as auditing and logging threats.
For authentication threats, all possible threats related to user identity and
login credentials that would possibly enable others to gain access to the system
are defined. The main concerns are loss (or theft) or sharing of user identities
and login credentials, and authenticating patient devices. Patients sharing
their login credentials with friends, relatives and/or healthcare providers may
cause potential impact, like identity misuse, tampering with patient data, or
private information disclosure, among others. Potential damage is classified as
low, medium or high, according to the distribution of the business functions
and processes. For instance, if one patient’s login credentials were lost (or
stolen), the impact would be low, because the damage would only affect one
patient; but if a healthcare provider’s identity was stolen, the impact would
be very high, because this may affect more than one patient.
Moreover, patient device authentication is very important. When a patient’s
communication device wants to communicate with the patient’s medical
device, both devices must authenticate each other, and ensure that they
are what/who they claim to be, and are not compromised by an attacker.
Similarly, when the patient’s communication device wants to send or receive
data from the PHR/EHR system, both require mutual authentication. Then
the PHR/EHR can trust that it is receiving/sending data from/to the correct
device (the right patient respectively), and the patient’s communication device
can trust that it is sending/receiving data to/from the correct server (the right
healthcare provider respectively).
In the second category (authorization and access threats) threats related to
unauthorized access to system components are listed. These threats include
elevation of privilege, data tampering and/or disclosure of confidential data.
With elevation of privilege threats, insiders may attempt to elevate their
privileges in order to gain additional access to system components. For
example, a patient or healthcare provider may impersonate the context of
administrators in order to gain additional privileges and more control over the
application or system. Data tampering refers to intentionally or accidentally
modify, add and/or delete data, caused by insiders having over-privileges
or inapplicable access control of a resource. Confidential data disclosure
potentially occurs if sensitive data, such as patient health records and login
credentials, can be viewed by unauthorized users due to improper data
protection. The potential damage of such threats is stated as low, medium
or high, depending on the distribution of business functions and processes.
According to Table 3 (Threat Class 2 (T2)), the majority of threats are rated
high, because for instance, gaining access to powerful accounts such as those
of members of local administrator groups or local system accounts may cause
massive damage to patients or healthcare providers.
In the third section of the table, threats related to privacy are identified.
Privacy is subject to a variety of threats, including access to sensitive data
in storage and data tampering. Threats to sensitive data in storage can
affect data stored in the patients’ communication devices or on PHR/EHR
servers. Improper data protection on patient communication devices may allow
attackers to read information not intended for disclosure.
In the final section, threats related to auditing and logging are listed. Auditing
and logging should be used to help detecting suspicious activities, such
as footprinting or possible password cracking attempts before exploitation
actually occurs. These can also help dealing with the threat of repudiation.
It is much harder for a user to deny performing an operation if a series of
synchronized log entries on multiple servers indicate that the user indeed
performed the transaction. Threats related to auditing and logging include
potential data repudiation, log tampering and insufficient auditing. Data
repudiation concerns users denying they had performed an action or initiated
a transaction. For example, a patient or healthcare professional denies or
claims that he/she did not receive, write or edit data. Log tampering entails
an insider attacking logs via log files. For threats due to insufficient auditing,
the logs must capture enough data to display what happened in the past and
they must be well-protected to ensure that attackers are not able to cover their
tracks.
Figure 3: Data Flow Diagram for telehealth trial system.
Table 3: Classification of Threats
Threat/ID
Threat Class 1 (T1): Authentication Threats
Description: unauthorized use or misuse of authorized user identities and login credentials
ID Description
Threat
agent STRIDE Impact
T1.1 Patient identity loss or identity sharing: the
patients leave their login credentials on a public place
(e.g. write them down on a piece of paper) or share
them with family, friends or relatives.
TA1.1 S Low
T1.2 Personnel identity loss or identity sharing:
healthcare providers, and/or system admins leave their
login credentials in public places or share them with
others.
TA2.1,
TA3.1,TA
3.2
S High
T1.3 Identity spoofing: patients reveal login credentials to
someone (e.g. social engineering attack).
TA1.1,
TA2.2,
TA2.3
S Low
T1.4 Identity theft and misuse: informal healthcare
assistant (e.g. friends or family members) misuse patient
identity to obtain medical services.
TA2.3 E Medium
T1.5 Identity theft and misuse: system admins misuse
patient identity for malicious acts (e.g. curiosity,
disclosure, fraud and/or sabotage).
TA3.1,
TA3.2
S High
T1.6 Spoofing of source: patient medical devices may be
spoofed by attackers, which may lead to incorrect data
being delivered to patient communication devices.
T4.1, T4.2 S High
T1.7 Spoofing of source: patient communication devices
may be spoofed by attackers, which may lead to data
being written to the attacker’s target instead of the
patients communication device.
T4.1 S Medium
T1.8 Spoofing of source: Personal/Electronic Health
Record (PHR/EHR) servers or telehealth service servers
may be spoofed by attackers, which may lead to incorrect
data being delivered to PHR/EHR servers or telehealth
service servers.
TA4.2 S High
Threat/ID
Threat Class 2 (T2): Authorization and Access Threats
Description: unauthorized access (including read, write, modify, delete) to confidential data
ID Description
Threat
agent STRIDE Impact
T2.1 Unauthorized access: unauthorized access to system
data using shared (or stolen) passwords.
TA 1.1, TA
2.1, TA 2.3,
E High
T2.2 Unauthorized access: patient intentional or acciden-
tal access beyond authorized privileges.
TA 1.1 E Low
T2.3 Unauthorized access: system admins and informal
healthcare professionals gain intentional unauthorized
access to patient data for malicious acts (e.g. curiosity,
disclosure).
TA 2.1,
TA3.2, A3.3
E High
T2.4 Data tampering: patients intentionally or accidentally
modify, add and/or delete data because of over-privileges
or inapplicable access control of a resource.
TA 1.1 T Medium
T2.5 Data tampering: formal healthcare professionals and
system admins intentionally or accidentally modify,
add and/or delete data because of over-privileges or
inapplicable access control of a resource.
TA 2.1, TA
3.2, A3.3
T High
T2.6 Elevation using impersonation: informal healthcare
professionals (e.g. friends or family members) may
impersonate the patients context in order to gain
additional privileges.
TA 2.3 E Medium
T2.7 Elevation using impersonation: formal healthcare
professionals or system admins may impersonate the
context of other healthcare professionals or system
admins in order to gain additional privileges.
TA2.1, TA
3.2, A3.3
E High
T2.8 Unauthorized access to administration interfaces:
malicious users may be able to gain access to configura-
tion management through administration interfaces.
TA 1.1, TA
2.1, TA 2.3,
TA3.2, A3.3
E High
Threat/ID
Threat Class 3 (T3): Privacy threats
Description: unauthorized disclosure to sensitive data
ID Description
Threat
agent STRIDE Impact
T3.1 Unauthorized disclosure: patients accidentally ac-
cess some confidential data via malware or file-sharing
tools installed on their communication devices.
TA 1.1 I Low
T3.2 Unauthorized disclosure: formal healthcare profes-
sionals and system admins intentionally or accidentally
access some confidential data via malware or file-sharing
tools installed on their communication devices.
TA 2.1,
TA3.2, A3.3
I High
T3.3 Lost device: patients losing their communication
devices would cause exposure of sensitive data such as
login credentials and PHR.
TA 1.1 I Medium
T3.4 Stolen device: theft of patient communication devices
that would cause exposure of sensitive data such as login
credentials and PHRs.
TA2.3 I Medium
T3.5 Weak access control: improperly protected data
stored in patients’ communication devices could allow
attackers to read information not intended for disclosure.
TA3.2 I Medium
Threat/ID
Threat Class 4 (T4): Auditing and Logging Threats
Description: suspicious activities detected, such as footprinting or possible password
cracking attempts before exploitation actually occurs
ID Description
Threat
agent STRIDE Impact
T4.1 Potential data repudiation: patient denies or claims
not receiving, writing or editing data.
TA 1.1 R Medium
T4.2 Potential data repudiation: formal healthcare
professionals or admins deny or claim not receiving,
writing or editing data.
TA 2.1,
TA3.2, A3.3
R High
T4.3 Log files tampering: patients, system admins or
formal or informal healthcare providers delete or update
log files in any way.
TA 1.1,TA
2.1, TA 2.3,
TA3.2, A3.3
T High
T4.4 Insufficient auditing: logging sufficient and appropri-
ate data to handle repudiation claims.
TA 1.1, TA
2.1, TA 2.3,
TA3.2, A3.3
R High
5. Mitigation Plan
Up to this point, all potential threats have been identified and analyzed.
To reduce the threats’ risk, the mitigation strategy to each threat must be
identified. According to the security and privacy protection requirements in
[4] and countermeasure techniques corresponding to STRIDE [12], Table 4
suggests a list of countermeasures to address the identified threats. Moreover,
security awareness is very paramount. All authorized users (patient, healthcare
provider and admins) should have an awareness program in which they should
learn about all types of security threats and their consequences.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
The motivation behind creating a threat model for telehealth systems is to
help enhancing system security in terms of protecting healthcare information
from security threats, such as patient data disclosure and/or unauthorized
access or modification by attackers, among others. In this work, a threat
model process for telehealth systems using Microsoft threat modeling tool
2014 was established. In order to prepare for threat mitigation, system assets,
threat agents, adverse actions, threats and their effects as well as a list of
countermeasures were identified and analyzed.
This work will be used to develop security requirements [4] and to better design
and implement system protection solutions against telehealth application
threats. In the future, the system security will be further investigated at
the Center for eHealth and Health Care Technology at the University of
Agder. The plan is also to analyze the outsider threats in the telehealth
trial system and verify whether implemented system protection solutions will
perform effectively and efficiently on identified threats.
Table 4: Threats and Countermeasures
STRIDE Threat Countermeasures
Spoofing T1.1, T1.2, T1.3, T1.5
T1.6, T1.7, T1.8 • Strong authentication: User must be authenticated to
the system using a strong password policy, biometrics or
multi-factor authentication mechanisms.
• Encryption: All credentials must be encrypted, and it has
to be ensured that credentials do not traverse the wire in
clear text form.
• Cryptographic protocols: Cryptographic protocols such
as TLS/SSL must be used to ensure a secure (encrypted)
communication between system components.
Tampering T2.4, T2.5, T4.3
• Strong authorization: Appropriate access control mech-
anisms such as role-based access control (RBAC) must
be deployed with least privileges and separation of duties
principles. Users must be assigned to access with mini-
mum privileges.
• Data hashing and signing: All confidential data must
be hashed and signed to ensure that the data is
valid (untampered and came from the correct/expected
source).
• Secure communication links: The communication links
between system components must be ensured by using
protocols that provide message integrity and confidential-
ity.
Repudiation T4.1, T4.2, T4.4
• Secure audit trails: All activities (such as successful
and unsuccessful authentication) and sensitive data (e.g.
cookies and authentication credentials ) must be logged
and recorded.
Information disclosure T3.1, T3.2, T3.3, T3.4,
T3.5 • Strong authorization: Ensure that an appropriate access
control mechanisms is deployed and only authorized users
can access to data.
• Encryption: Ensure that all sensitive data is encrypted
( in storage or during transit) and only authorized users
can read this data.
• Secure communication links: Ensure that all communica-
tion links are secured with protocols that provide message
confidentiality.
Elevation of privilege T1.4, T2.1, T2.2, T2.3,
T2.6, T2.7, T2.8, • Principle of least privilege : All authorized user must have
a least privilege and minimum required access.
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